University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 9
Issue 1 Fall 1979

Article 10

1979

Casenotes: Evidence — Scientific Evidence —
Spectrographic Voice Identification Held
Inadmissible Pending the General Acceptance of
the Technique by the Scientific Community. Reed
v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978)
Daniel R. Anderson
University of Baltimore School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Anderson, Daniel R. (1979) "Casenotes: Evidence — Scientific Evidence — Spectrographic Voice Identification Held Inadmissible
Pending the General Acceptance of the Technique by the Scientific Community. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978),"
University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 9: Iss. 1, Article 10.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol9/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

EVIDENCE - SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE - SPECTROGRAPHIC
VOICE IDENTIFICATION HELD INADMISSIBLE PENDING
THE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE TECHNIQUE BY THE
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY. REED v. STATE, 283 Md. 374, 391
A.2d 364 (1978).
In Reed v. State, 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
spectrographic voice identification 2 has not achieved general
acceptance among the members of the relevant scientific community
and is, therefore, inadmissible in a criminal tria1. 3 In so holding, the
court of appeals declined to join the growing number of jurisdictions,
albeit still the minority, that have admitted evidence of spectrographic analysis. 4 The court adopted the standard enunciated in Frye v.
United States,S which requires that a scientific principle or technique
"be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs"6 before it is deemed to have
crossed "the line between experimental and demonstrable stages,"
thereby allowing it to be admitted into evidence. 7 With this holding,
Reed became the first Maryland case to adopt the Frye standard for
determination of the admissibility of scientific evidence. 8 This
1. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
2. The common name for this identification procedure is "voiceprint." Courts,
however, have expressed disapproval of that name because it raises the specter
of a fingerprint, thereby connoting an "absolute certainty and accuracy which is
neither justified by the facts nor claimed by the experts in the field." United
States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 465 n.1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
See generally Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes, Stevens & Pickett, Speaker Identifica·
tion by Speech Spectrograms: A Scientists' View of its Reliability for Legal
Purposes, 47 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC'y AM. 597 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bolt
Report].
3. 283 Md. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377 (1978).
4. It has been argued that there is a trend favoring the admissibility of this
technique. This "trend" is the result of so-called "neutral" studies conducted by
Dr. Oscar Tosi of Michigan State University, in conjunction with the Michigan
State Police Department, which determined that spectrographic voice identification was an accurate identifier of voices. See Black, Lashbrook, Nash, Oyer,
Pedrey, Tosi & Truby, Reply to "Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms:
Some Further Observations", 54 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC'y AM. 535 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tosi Report]. The neutrality of the Tosi studies was challenged by the
Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537
(1977), wherein the court questioned the impartiality of Dr. Tosi, whose career
was built upon "voiceprint" work. Id. at 539. Michigan refuses to admit
spectrographic voice analysis into evidence.
5. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (involving the exclusion of test results of a
precursor to the polygraph test that measured deception by changes in the
systolic blood pressure of the witness).
6. Id.
7. This standard has been extracted from dicta supplied by the Frye court. As that
court explained: "Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized . . . ." Id. at 1014.
8. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 400, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978) (Smith, J., dissenting).
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casenote analyzes the Reed decision and presents an overview of
judicial treatment of spectrographic voice identification to date.

I.

THE FACTS

In 1974, a woman was raped and sexually assaulted in a wooded
area adjacent to her home. The victim later received a telephone call
from a man who identified himself as the assailant. The woman
immediately notified the police, who subsequently installed a tape
recording device on her telephone to record any future communications from the caller. During the next few days, the woman received
eight calls from her professed assailant; each of these conversations
was recorded. In one conversation, the woman, acting upon
instructions from the police, offered to pay the caller $1,000.00 if he
would stop harassing her, and arrangements were made to deposit
the money in a specified locker in a bus station. The money was
deposited in the locker at the designated time and, pursuant to the
caller's instructions, a key to the locker was placed in a specified
location. Reed was arrested by the police after he obtained the key
and proceeded to the locker. He was subsequently indicted in
Montgomery County Circuit Court for rape and other charges
arising out of the same incident. 9
During the course of its investigation, the Montgomery County
State's Attorney's Office compelled Reed to provide voice exemplars
by having Reed repeat, into a telephone connected to a recording
device, the same words that had been spoken to the victim in the
earlier, recorded telephone calls.lO These tapes, together with the
tapes of the calls made by the professed assailant, were sent to the
Voice Identification Unit of the Michigan State Police l l where, after
one inconclusive test, Reed was positively identified as the speaker
in four of the seven telephone calls made to the victim.12
A pretrial hearing was held pursuant to the defendant's motion
to suppress evidence of voice identification based upon these
spectographic analyses. This motion was denied, and during the
course of the trial the State introduced expert testimony based on
spectrographic analysis, establishing that the voice on the master
9. Id. at 375-76, 391 A.2d at 365.
10. Id. at 376, 391 A.2d at 365. The compelled production of voice exemplars does not
violate the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self·incrimination,
because the exemplars are used solely for identification purposes, and not for the
testimonial or communicative content of the utterances. United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
11. The Michigan State Police force is considered the nationwide leader in the field
of spectrographic voice analysis, primarily due to Dr. Tosi's initial study which
was conducted in conjunction with that force. See note 4 supra.
12. The remaining three calls were incapable of spectrographic analysis due to
technical reasons. One call was too short to obtain a sufficient number of words
on which an analysis could be done, one call was too distorted, and no voice
exemplar had been obtained for the third. 283 Md. at 376 n.l, 391 A.2d at 365 n.1.
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tape and the voice on the exemplars were the same. 13 The jury
returned a verdict of guilty, and Reed appealed the judgment on the
ground that the admission of the tapes as well as the expert
testimony analyzing them was reversible error.14 The court of special
appeals affirmed Reed's conviction. IS The Court of Appeals of
Maryland subsequently granted certiorari and reversed Reed's
conviction, holding that evidence based upon spectrographic voice
analysis is inadmissible. ls

II. SPECTROGRAPHIC VOICE IDENTIFICATION
Proponents of spectrographic voice analysis premise their
support of the technique on the theory that no two human voices are
identicalP Because the vocal characteristics of anyone individual
are the result of complex physiological and mechanical functions
within the individual, it is highly improbable that two people would
share identical vocal characteristics. IS This phenomenon has led
13. Reed v. State, 35 Md. App. 472, 477, 372 A.2d 243, 248 (1977). The expert called by
the state was Sgt. Lonnie Smrkovski of the Michigan State Police Voice
Identification Unit. Smrkovski had qualified as an expert on voice identification
in at least six states and had never been rejected as an expert in the field by a
court. Id. at 477 n.7, 372 A.2d at 248 n.7 (1977).
14. Reed appealed on several grounds: (1) whether the best evidence rule was
violated when the court permitted a copy of the original tapes to be used for
comparison purposes due to the loss of the original tape by the police, Id. at 484,
372 A.2d at 252; (2) whether the police tap placed on the victim's phone was legal,
Id. at 487, 372 A.2d at 253; (3) whether the victim should have been allowed to
testify that she recognized the appellant's voice in a police station line·up
conducted after his arrest and whether that identification was otherwise
unreliable, Id. at 489, 372 A.2d at 254 (1977); (4) whether the appellant was
wrongfully compelled to provide voice exemplars, Id. at 491, 372 A.2d at 255; (5)
whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a telephone call made by
the appellant to the complainant two days prior to his scheduled trial at a time
when he was under indictment and his counsel was not present, Id. at 494, 372
A.2d at 257. The court of special appeals answered all of these issues in the
negative. The court of appeals, however, granted certiorari on two issues: viz. the
admissibility of the spectrographic voice evidence, and the use of tape copies in
violation of the best evidence rule. The Reed court never reached the best
evidence issue because it reversed on the spectrographic voice analysis evidence.
See 283 Md. 374, 377 n.2, 391 A.2d 364, 366 n.2.
15. 35 Md. App. 472, 372 A.2d 243 (1977).
16. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978)
17. See generally Decker & Handler, Voiceprint Identification Evidence - Out of the
Frye Pan Into Admissibility, 26 AM. D.L. REv. 314, 318 (1977); Kersta, Speaker
Recognition and Identification by Voiceprint, 40 CONN. B.J. 586, 589 (1966). But
see Jones, Danger - Voiceprints Ahead, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 549, 550 (1973).
18. An individual's speech is created by a complex mechanical and physiological
operation. Air exhaled past the vocal cords causes them to vibrate and produce
pressure waves that are then modified by the vocal cavities (throat, nose, and
cavities formed in the mouth by the positioning of the tongue), and by
articulators (lips, teeth, tongue, palate and jaw muscles). See generally Jones,
Danger - Voiceprints Ahead, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 549, 550 (1973). The
interaction of these sound waves with both the articulators and the vocal cavities
results in the production of human speech. See also A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU,
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES, 564-86 (2d ed. 1978); 19 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS, Spectrogram Voice Identification at 423-41 (1967).
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many scientists to adhere to the belief that a voice, when properly
analyzed, can be used to identify accurately an unknown speaker. 19
Notwithstanding this belief, scientists differ as to the proper
technique for voice analysis.2"l
A "spectrographic voice analysis" is a visual representation of
human speech.21 Stated simply, a voice spectrograph machine
transforms the human sound waves into their respective frequencies
and plots these frequencies on electronically sensitive paper.22 A
comparison of a spectrograph conducted on a known voice with a
spectrograph of an unknown voice provides the basis for voice
identification. If the frequencies of the two voices contain the
requisite number of similarities, the proponents of the process claim
that the two speakers are the same. 23 The leading proponent among
the scientific community today in the area of spectrographic voice
analysis is Dr. Oscar Tosi. In 1969, Dr. Tosi, a professor of
audiology, speech science, and physics at Michigan State University, undertook a two-year study of voice spectrograms as an

19. See generally Decker & Handler, Voiceprint Identification Evidence - Out of the
Frye Pan Into Admissibility, 26 AM. D.L. REV. 314 (1977); Kersta, Speaker
Recognition and Identification by Voiceprint, 40 CONN. B.J. 586 (1966).
20. See Tosi Report, supra note 4. See also Bolt Report, supra note 2.
21. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 414, 391 A.2d 364, 384 (1977) (Smith, J., dissenting).
22. The sound spectrograph consists of four· basic parts: (1) a magnetic recording
device, (2) a variable electronic filter, (3) a papercarrying drum that is coupled to
the magnetic recording device, and (4) an electric stylus that marks the paper as
the drum rotates.
The magnetic recording device is used to record a short sample of speech.
The duration of the speech sample corresponds to the time required for
one revolution of the drum. Then the speech sample is played repeatedly
in order to analyze its spectral contents. For each revolution of the drum,
the variable electronic filter passes only a certain band of frequencies,
and the energy in the frequency band activates the electric stylus so that
a straight line of varying darkness is produced across the paper. The
degree of darkness represents the varying amplitude of the speech signal
at the specified time within the given frequency band. As the drum
revolves, the variable electronic filter moves to higher and higher
frequencies, and the electric stylus moves parallel to the axis of the
drum. Thus a pattern of closely-spaced lines is generated on the paper.
·This pattern, which is the spectrogram, has the dimensions offrequency,
time and amplitude..
A SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO THE LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION, VOICE IDENTIFICATION RESEARCH 6 (LEAA Grant
# NI-7Q-004, Feb. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as LEAA Study].
23. Developed by Bell Laboratories during the Second World War in an effort to
identify and "track" German radio operators in the European theater and
thereby monitor troop movements, see Reed v. State, 35 Md. App. 472, 473, 372
A.2d 243, 246 (1977), the spectrographic voice analysis technique was "rediscovered" in 1962 by Dr. Lawrence Kersta in response to the need of law
enforcement agencies to identify telephone bomb threat callers. See generally
Kamine, The Voiceprint Technique: Its Structure and Reliability, 6 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 213, 227 (1969); Decker & Handler, Voiceprint Identification Ev.idence Out of the Frye Pan and into Admissibility, 26 AM. D.L. REV. 314, 320 n.37
(1977). A failure to duplicate forensic conditions, however, resulted in widespread
criticism of Dr. Kersta's study.
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identification tool, ultimately concluding that they are' reliable. 24
Working in conjunction with the Michigan State Police, Tosi
conducted his study of voice spectrographs in a more thorough and
verifiable manner than earlier works in the field. This study
provided empirical support for proponents of this identification
technique,25 and soon resulted in greater judicial acceptance of the
controversial voice spectrograph as a method of identification. 26
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT
Only one court of final appeal admitted spectrographic voice
analysis prior to the completion of the Tosi study,27 In Wright u.
United States,28 the United States Court of Military Appeals, in
affirming the court martial conviction of James Wright for making
obscene and threatening phone calls to two women, ruled that expert
testimony based upon spectrographic voice analyses purporting to
identify Wright's voice as the voice recorded by one of the victims 29
was admissible. In the opinion of the Wright court, the evidence was
admissible because members of the court-martial board were
permitted to listen to the tape recorded voice of the offender and
could thereby judge for themselves the accuracy of the spectrographic evidence.a:J Presumably, the Wright court believed that any
undue weight that a jury might ordinarily attach to this scientific
evidence would be offset by its ability to compare the voices
aurally. 31
During this same period, civilian courts of final appeal took a
more skeptical approach to the admission of spectrographic voice
analysis. 32 In 1971, however, after the completion of the Tosi
study, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in State ex rel. Trimble u.
24. See LEAA Study, supra note 22.
25. Tosi's study indicated that his use of voice spectrographs yielded an error rate of
approximately 6% false identifications, and approximately 12% false elimination.
[d. at 14. False identification occurs when a match is not present but the
examiner mistakenly believes there is one or a match is present but an examiner
selects the wrong one. [d. at 10-11. False elimination occurs when an examiner
fails to match voices when a voice is present. [d.
26. Compare State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680, remanded for further
testimony, 53 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d 15, aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1968) (voice
spectrograph held inadmissible due to failure to attain general acceptance
among experts in the field) with State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 42,
192 N.W.2d 432 (1971) (voice spectrograph admitted into evidence on the grounds
that difference of opinion in the scientific community goes to the weight, and not
the admissibility of the evidence).
27. United States v. Wright, 17 C.M.A. 183,37 C.M.R. 447 (1967).
28. [d.
29. [d. at 189, 37 C.M.R. at 453.
30. [d. "Voice identification of a person by human ear is a commonplace experience,
and has long been recognized in the courts." [d. at 188, 37 C.M.R. at 453.
31. [d.
32. See, e.g., People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968) (admission
of identification based on voiceprint held reversible error).
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Hedman 33 became the first civilian court to sustain the admissibility
of spectrographic voice identification evidence. Although the
evidence in that case was admitted for the purpose of establishing probable cause to issue arrest and search warrants, the court,
citing the testimony of Dr. Tosi, held that "in the trial of the case
spectrograms ought to be admissible for the purpose of corroborating
voice identification by aural means."34 According to the Trimble
court, disagreement within the relevant scientific community does
not, of itself, make the opinion of an expert in· that field
inadmissible. "Where experts disagree," the court stated, "it is for
the fact finder ... to determine which [expert opinion] is more
credible and therefore more acceptable."35 Since Trimble, the
majority of jurisdictions confronted with such evidence have held it
admissible,36 albeit on different grounds. 37 Additionally, it should be
noted that many jurisdictions that have upheld the admissibility of
spectrographic voice analysis have declined to decide whether such
evidence is routinely admissible. 38

33. 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
34. [d. at 458, 192 N.W.2d at 44l.
35. [d. at 456, 192 N.W.2d at 440.
36. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
1025 (1979); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1019 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 525 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. App.
1972); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367
Mass. 191,327 N.E.2d 671 (1975); State ex rei. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442,
192 N.W.2d 432 (1971); People v. Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup.
Ct 1976); State v. alderman, 44 Ohio App. 2d 130, 336 N.E.2d 442 (1975).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.) (trial judge's
discretion as to whether evidential value outweighs prejudicial harm was
properly exercised in the admission of the spectrographic evidence), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1019 (1975); Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(evidence admissible to corroborate defendant's identification by other means);
State v. Williams, 338 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978) (the trial judge is given the
discretion to admit scientific evidence which has not yet achieved the general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community if the proffered evidence is
sufficiently reliable to be held relevant); State ex rei. Trimble v. Hedman, 291
Minn. 442, 450, 192 N.W.2d 432, 440 (1971) (difference of opinion in the scientific
community goes to the weight and not to the admissibility of the evidence);
People v. Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228, 237 (1976) (spectrographic
voice identification has been generally accepted by those scientists who would be
expected to be familiar with its use).
38. See, e.g., Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 780, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973)
(spectrographic evidence was corroborative of other direct testimony inculpating
the defendant); Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (additional
evidence was present to corroborate the identity of the defendant as the one who
committed the crime); Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(evidence against the defendant was already sufficient to convict him); State ex
rei. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971) (spectrographic
analysis admissible for purposes of establishing probable cause); State v.
Andretta, 61 N.J. 544, 296 A.2d 644 (1972) (specifically declining to decide
whether spectrographic analysis would be routinely admissible at trial).
In Worley v. State, supra, a case in which the evidence against the defendant
was already sufficient to convict him, the court stated that:
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The debate over the proper standards for governing the
admissibility of scientific evidence has divided the jurisdictions of
this country. On one end of the spectrum are those jurisdictions that
refuse to admit any scientific evidence until the technique has
gained the general acceptance of the scientific community in which
it belongs. 39 This stricter standard of admissibility arose out of the
case of Frye v. United States,40 which held inadmissible a precursor
of the polygraph test: 41
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go
a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.42
On the other end of the adinissibility spectrum are those
jurisdictions that follow the guidelines established in Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 43 Rule 702 allows the admission of
any scientific evidence upon a showing of reliability and allows any
dispute within the scientific community as to the accuracy of the
process to go to the weight as opposed to the admissibility of the
evidence. 44 It is this more liberal view that has been propounded by
Dean McCormick, who wrote that "any relevant conclusions which
are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless

[T]his decision must be limited by our facts. We hold voiceprints were
properly admitted to corroborate the defendant's identification by other
means . . . . [W]e do not decide if ... voiceprint identification, standing
alone, would be sufficient to sustain the identification and conviction of
the defendant.
263 So. 2d at 614-15. See generally Greene, Voiceprint Identification: The Case in
Favor of Admissibility, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 171 (1975).
39. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
40.Id.
41. See note 5 supra.
42. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphasis added).
43. The federal rule provides as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to' understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EVID.702.
44. Id. See also United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970) (quoted in United States v. Baller, 519
F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975)); Reed v. State, 283 Md.
374, 403, 391 A.2d 364, 379 (1978) (Smith, J., dissenting).
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there are other reasons for exclusion."45 The prevalent reason for
exclusion in the jurisdictions applying this standard has been the
failure of the probative value of the scientific evidence to exceed the
prejudicial effect such evidence may have upon a jury.46
A. The Reed Decision

There are two basic premises underlying the majority's adoption
of the Frye standard of admissibility. First, fairness to the defendant
requires that before the results of a scientific process can be used
against him, he is entitled to a scientific judgment on the reliability
of the process. 47 Second, because the scientific method in dispute
must be one that is generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community, the defendant will have a "minimal reserve" of experts
who can critically examine the validity of the scientific determination in his particular case. 48
1.

Fairness to the Defendant

The Reed court maintained that the "apparent objectivity of the
[spectrograph] machine may sl.lggest a degree of certainty inconsistent with the subjective aspects of the enterprise."49 The majority
feared that the admission of the scientific evidence, particularly
when presented by experts, would cause a lay jury to attach an
inordinate amount of weight to the evidence and to accept the
spectrograph identification as infallible. 50 Notwithstanding the Reed
trial judge's carefully worded instruction that the jury could either
accept or reject an expert's opinion regarding spectrographs or
assign to the opinion whatever weight it believed the opinion

45. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 203, at 489 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK'S ]. " 'General scientific acceptance' is a proper
condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the
admissibility of scientific evidence." Id.
46. A lie detector, or polygraph, test is a common example of this possible prejudicial
effect. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975). But
see United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
1025 (1979); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978) (probative value of
spectrographic voice analysis outweighs prejudicial effect). See generally Note,
64 CORNELL L. REV. 875 (1979).
47. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 386, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (1978).
48. Id. at 386, 391 A.2d at 370 (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744
(D.C. Cir. 1974».
49. Id. at 385, 391 A.2d at 370.
50.Id.
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merited,51 the court of appeals found the charge inadequate. 52
Because a "misleading aura of certainty ... often envelops a new
scientific process obscuring its currently experimental nature,"53 the
court of appeals chose to exclude spectrographic evidence from the
consideration of the jury.54
In addition, the Reed court maintained that the Frye standard of
admissibility would enhance the conduct of a trial by guaranteeing
that each judgment be rendered on the merits of the litigation. 55
Employing this standard, the court reasoned, would preclude each
trial from degenerating into a trial of the scientific process
involved. 56 Further, the Frye standard would guarantee a uniform
result within the jurisdiction regarding the validity of a particular
piece of scientific evidence. This would not be the case if each judge
51. Id. at 492-93, 391 A.2d at 422-23. The instruction to the jury consisted of the
following:
Ladies and gentlemen, the rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit a
witness to testify as to his opinions or conclusion. There are exceptions. I
think in the course of this trial you have learned that even a person
without prior experience or expertise, particular experience, training or
expertise, is permitted by our law if they are familiar with a particular
voice or have heard a particular voice, to express an opinion as to
whether another voice is the same as or different from the other voice
which they heard. But generally speaking, a witness is not allowed to
express an opinion or a conclusion. An expert witness is an exception to
this rule.
A witness who by education and experience has become expert in
any art, science or profession, may be permitted to state his opinion, as
to a matter in which he is versed and which is material to the case. He
may also state the reasons for that opinion. This testimony should be
considered and weighed by you like any other evidence in the case and
given the weight to which you deem the opinion to be entitled.
You may reject the opinion if the facts upon which it is based have
not been established to your satisfaction by the evidence, or if you are
not satisfied with the reasons given in support of the opinion. Where
expert witnesses disagree, it is for you to decide which one, if either, is to
be believed.
In this particular case, ladies and gentlemen, you have heard
testimony pertaining to voice identification with the aid of spectrographic analysis. The same rules apply to that type of testimony as I just
gave you. It is your function to weigh the testimony of the various
witnesses when they are testifying in that area and to assign such
weight at all, some weight, or much weight, as you find it to be entitled.
52. Id. at 398-99, 391 A.2d at 377.
53. Id. at 386, 391 A.2d at 370 (quoting People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31-32, 549 P.2d
1240, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1976».
54. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978).
55. Id. at 388, 391 A.2d at 371. The majority wrote:
The introduction of evidence based on a scientific process, not yet
generally accepted in the scientific community, is likely to distract the
fact finder from its central concern, namely the rendition of a judgment
on the merits of the litigation. Without the Frye test or something
similar, the reliability of an experimental scientific technique is likely to
become a central issue in each trial in which it is introduced, as long as
there remains serious disagreement in the scientific community over its
reliability.
56.Id.
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or jury were permitted to determine that issue for itself. Under the
Frye test, the court explained, all defendants will face the same
burdens with regard to scientific techniques. 57 "If ... on the other
hand," Judge Eldridge wrote on behalf of the court, "a novel
scientific process does achieve general acceptance in the scientific
community, there will likely be as little dispute over its reliability as
there is now concerning other areas of forensic science which have
been deemed admissible under the Frye standard, such as blood
tests, ballistics tests, etc."58
2.

Minimal Reserve of Experts

The second premise upon which the Reed court based its
adoption of the Frye standard was the belief that Frye provides the
defendant a greater opportunity to rebut spectrographic evidence
with expert witnesses of his own. Frye requires that a scientific
process attain general acceptance in the field in which it belongs
before such evidence is admissible. 59 With a scientific process such
as spectrographic voice identification, however, there is considerable
controversy concerning the particular scientific field in which it
should be placed. 60 The trial court in Reed concluded that the Frye
test requires general acceptance among the scientific group actually
engaged in the use of spectrograph analysis and in the experimentation with the technique. 61 That court specifically excluded from the
relevant scientific community the broader aggregate of scientists
engaged in the speech and hearing sciences, among whom, the court
conceded, there probably was not acceptance of spectrographic voice
analysis. 62 The Reed majority rejected this approach and stated that
there was no basis for eliminating from consideration "the opinions
of those scientists in the field of speech and hearing, as well as
related fields, who, by training and education, are competent to
make professional judgments concerning experiments undertaken by
others."63 The reasoning behind the majority's position is that the

57.
58.
59.
60.

[d.
[d.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
In his dissent, Judge Smith suggests that anyone with training in the field of
physics would be a member of the "relevant scientific community." 283 Md. at
495, 391 A.2d at 424. Several courts have defined the relevant scientific field as
those scientists who would be acquainted with the use of the process involved.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 196,327 N.E.2d 671, 677 (1975).
Finally, at least one court has held that spectrographic voice analysis is not
properly placed within anyone established category of science but rather
requires a knowledge of anatomy, physiology, physics, psychology and
linguistics. See, e.g., People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478
(1968).
61. Joint Record Extract at 82, Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
62. [d. at 83.
63. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978).
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defendant must be guaranteed a "minimal reserve of experts" to
dispute the scientific process that is being used against him.64
The need for this reserve of experts can best be illustrated by a
hypothetical situation in which only one scientist had done work in
a particular area of scientific development. Under the narrow
interpretation of the Frye standard, as expounded by the Reed trial
court, that scientific evidence would most certainly be admitted
because of the defendant's inability to rebut the validity of the
evidence presented for want of an expert of his own to testify. The
court of appeals, however, would allow the defendant to oppose
introduction of the scientific evidence through the use of scientific
experts who are deemed competent to make a professional judgment
regarding that evidence. Their failure to have worked directly with
the process would be deemed irrelevant to the issue of their ability to
refute the evidence. 65
The majority in Reed concluded that evidence adduced at the
trial level indicated that spectrographic voice analysis had not been
accorded the general acceptance of the relevant scientific community
and was, therefore, inadmissible. This holding was due in part to
testimony which indicated that, of the experts who had done work
with spectrographic voice identification, fifteen were proponents of
the process and five opposed it. 66 Additionally, evidence was presented indicating that the Speech Communications Section of the
Acoustical Society of America had voted unanimously against an
endorsement of the reliability of the procedure. 67 The majority did
not rule out the possibility that spectrographic voice analysis
evidence would be admissible in the future following a showing of
general scientific acceptance of the technique, but concluded that
such a showing was absent in this case. 68

64. Id. at 386, 391 A.2d at 370 (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744
(D.C. Cir. 1974».
65. Of course, because of his failure to have worked directly with the process, the
degree of expertise the witness has by virtue of his studies in a related area
would be seriously considered by the trial judge in determining the admissibility
of the evidence. The Reed dissent maintains that such a minimal reserve of
experts is available, citing to the Practicing Law Institute's "Voiceprint Defense
Package" which lists the witnesses available for the defense in spectrographic
voice identification cases. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 497, 391 A.2d 364, 425
(1978). According to testimony adduced at trial, the number of scientists who
have actually worked with spectrographic voice analysis is approximately
twenty. Id. at 393, 391 A.2d at 374. Of these, five are opposed to the process and
fifteen are proponents. Id. Applying the trial court's standard of admissibility
(which the dissent would adopt), the relevant scientific community is therefore
twenty. Query: Is the limitation of five expert witnesses to be considered a
"minimal reserve" of experts?
66. Id. at 393, 391 A.2d at 374.
67. Id. at 394, 391 A.2d at 374.
68. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
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The Reed Dissent

In a 104-page opinion authored by Judge Smith and concurred in
by Chief Judge Murphy and Judge Orth,69 the dissent maintained
that spectrographic voice evidence should be deemed admissible as
evidence in a criminal trial and that any dispute within the scientific
community as to the technique's accuracy should go to the weight
and not the admissibility of the evidence. 7o Explaining that
Maryland had never adopted a standard of admissibility similar to
that employed in Frye,71 the dissent contended that the admission of
expert testimony predicated upon a scientific technique is within the
sound discretion of the trial COurt. 72 The Reed majority pointed out,
however, that when expert testimony based on the application of
new scientific techniques is involved, "prior to the admission of such
testimony, it must be established that the particular scientific
method is itself reliable."73 Arguing that spectrographic voice
analyses meet this requirement, the dissent took issue with the
majority's use of the Frye standard in determining reliability.
Recalling that Frye dealt with the admissibility of a precursor of the
polygraph test,74 Judge Smith contended that the more strict
standard of admissibility established by that case was necessary
only for that particular form of scientific evidence because a
"polygraph examination embraces a number of complexities not
present in the areas of fingerprint, handwriting, voice-print,
ballistics and neutron activation analysis. These deal primarily with
physical phenomena rather than psychological responses."75 The
dissent concluded that such a strict standard is not necessary for the
admission of spectrographic voice identification evidence. 76
In support of his thesis, Judge Smith examined other scientific
procedures dealing with "physical phenomena" and their respective
treatment by various courts in this country.77 The dissent concluded
that other jurisdictions have admitted scientific evidence despite a
contemporaneous disagreement among the relevant scientific
community as to its accuracy.78 Judge Smith cited as an example the
admission of fingerprint identification evidence, which was first
upheld by an illinois appellate court in 1911 upon the principle that
"whatever tends to prove any material fact is relevant and
competent."79 Judge Smith conceded, however, that the Court of
69. [d. at 504, 391 A.2d at 428 (Smith, J., dissenting).
70. [d. at 457, 391 A.2d at 406 (Smith, J., dissenting).
71. [d.
72. [d. at 452, 391 A.2d at 403 (Smith, J., dissenting).
73. [d. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367.
74. See note 5 supra.
75. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 449, 391 A.2d 364, 401 (1978) (Smith, J., dissenting).
76. [d. at 451, 391 A.2d at 402 (Smith, J., dissenting).
77. [d. at 417-51, 391 A.2d at 386-402.
78. [d.

79. People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 549, 96 N.E. 1077, 1082 (1911).
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Appeals of Maryland was not faced with the issue of admissibility
until 1944, at which time the court took judicial notice of the process'
infallibility.8J The Maryland court therefore was not then faced with
the split among the relevant scientific community present in the
Reed case. 81 Citing a 1902 opinion of Oliver Wendell Holmes,82 who
was at that time Chief Judge of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, the Reed dissent explained that the then-novel
science of firearms identification was admitted into evidence on the
theory that the jury could visually compare the markings on the test
bullet and the expended bullet itself, thereby allowing it to make a
decision as to the accuracy of the identification independent of
expert testimony.83 The Maryland court first heard an appeal of the
admission into evidence of ballistics identification in 1951 and by
that time the science was concededly "well established."84 Once
again, Maryland was not confronted with a difference of opinion
among the scientific community as to the accuracy of the scientific
evidence. Judge Smith explained that by the time the results of a
blood test were at issue before an appellate court, there was no
dispute as to the accuracy of the process itself.85 Citing to the
Maryland case of Shanks v. State,86 however, the dissent stated that
such blood tests have been held admissible as evidence even though
the results ofthe tests were inconclusive. 87 Unlike the spectrographic
issue confronting the Reed court, however, the dispute in Shanks did
not concern the reliability of the process itself, but rather was
concerned with the probative value to be attached to the evidence
when two persons had the same blood type. 88
The dissent concluded that jurors are not so easily swayed by
scientific evidence as to warrant application of the Frye standard in
cases involving spectrographic voice analysis. 89 Citing Chief Judge
Marbury's opinion for the court in Shanks/X) Judge Smith observed:
"Judges and juries must be presumed to have average intelligence at
least, and no assumption to the contrary can be made for the
purpose of excluding otherwise admissible testimony."91

80.
8l.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
9l.

Murphy v. State, 184 Md. 70, 85-86, 40 A.2d 239, 246 (1944).
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 274, 392-93, 391 A.2d 364, 373-74 (1978).
Commonwealth v. Best, 180 Mass. 492, 62 N.E. 748 (1902).
[d. at 495-96, 62 N.E. at 750.
Edwards v. State, 198 Md. 132, 81 A.2d 631 (1951).
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 430. 391 A.2d 364, 392 (1978) (Smith, J., dissenting).
185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945).
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 432-33, 391 A.2d 364, 393 (1978) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
[d.
[d. at 502, 391 A.2d at 427 (Smith, J., dissenting).
185 Md. at 449, 45 A.2d at 90.
283 Md. at 502-03, 391 A.2d at 427-28 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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The Significance of Reed

Although Maryland courts have heretofore readily accepted the
admissibility into evidence of other scientific techniques, it cannot
be said that Reed necessarily represents a deviation from prior
judicial treatment of such evidence. Reed was the first case in which
the Maryland courts were confronted with determining the admissibility of a scientific technique at a time when the technique in
controversy was still in its formative years. In all prior cases, the
scientific techniques at issue had been in use for decades before the
question of their admissibility reached the Maryland courts.
Foreshadowings of the Reed decision, however, can be found as
far back as 1945 when, writing for the court of appeals in Shanks,
Chief Judge Marbury stated,
In the early cases evidence of the tests was not admitted,
because the courts here were not convinced of their general
acceptance and reliability . . . . Blood tests are now
accepted everywhere, scientifically, as accurate . . . . 92
It is evident that the Shanks court readily admitted the blood tests
into evidence because of longstanding and widespread acceptance in
other jurisdictions. It may be inferred from the Shanks court's
acknowledgment that the tests were not admitted when the
Maryland courts were not convinced of their general acceptance,
however, that had blood tests not achieved the acceptance that they
had by 1945, it is likely that the result in Shanks would have been
different.
Additionally, in more recent cases in which the Maryland courts
have been confronted with determining the admissibility of novel
scientific techniques into evidence in criminal cases, the courts have
employed language and analysis indicating a predilection toward
the Frye standard of admissibility. In 1976, in Smith v. State,93 the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland refused to allow the results of
a psychological stress evaluation test into evidence, holding that
such "tests have not yet attained sufficient scientific acceptance as
an accurate and reliable means of ascertaining truth or deception."94
In the earlier case of Rawlings v. State,95 the court of special appeals
employed a similar analysis in excluding from evidence the results
of a polygraph examination. 96

92. Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 440, 45 A.2d 85, 86 (1945) (citations omitted).
93. 31 Md. App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976).
94. [d. at 119-20, 355 A.2d at 535 (quoting State v. La Forest, 106 N.H. 159, 160, 207
A.2d 429, 430 (1965».
95. 7 Md. App. 611, 256 A.2d 704 (1969).
96. [d. at 614-15, 256 A.2d at 706.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although spectrographic voice analysis was greeted with initial
skepticism, since the completion of Dr. Tosi's study 97 courts have
been increasingly willing to admit such evidence. 98 Those jurisdictions that have admitted the results of this scientific technique
have almost uniformly applied the Frye standard of admissibility,
but have defined the "relevant scientific community" more narrowly
than did the majority in Reed. 99
In his dissent, Judge Smith concluded that after the majority's
holding in Reed, no trial judge "in his right mind" would, in the
future, allow the admission into evidence of spectrographic voice
analyses. loo The Reed decision, however, does not preclude the
admission into evidence of spectrographic voice analysis for all time
but only until such time as the process achieves the general
acceptance of the relevant scientific community. According to Reed,
the relevant community includes both those scientists who have
experimented with the spectrograph machines and those within the
broader field of speech and hearing sciences. 101 With the proper
standards now established by the Reed court, presumably trial
judges in this state are capable of accurately polling this portion of
the scientific community with regard to the accuracy of the
technique. With the increased experimentation in the field of
spectrographic evidence, combined with the narrow four-to-three
decision of the Reed court and the new composition of the court of
appeals,102 the future disposition of spectrographic evidence is far
less certain than the Reed dissent would have us believe.

Daniel R. Andersont
97. See text accompanying notes 17-26 supra.
98. See note 36 supra.
Because an increasing number of jurisdictions have admitted this evidence,
an argument can, and has, been made that there is a trend in favor of
admissibility. Recent opinions denying admission of spectrographic voice
evidence, however, suggest that there may not be a clear trend. See Brown v.
United States, 384 A.2d 647, 650 (D.C. 1978) (trial court's admission of
spectrographic evidence held as harmless error); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141,
148, 257 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1977) ("We conclude that ... voiceprint evidence has
[not] achieved general scientific acceptance as a reliable identification device
. . . . "); Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223-32, 369 A.2d 1277, 1282 (1977)
("[V]oiceprint identification has not, as yet, been generally accepted by the
scientific community concerned with acoustical science").
99. Notable exceptions are those cases cited in note 44 supra, wherein the balancing
test employed in the Federal Rules of Evidence was adopted.
100. Id. at 504, 391 A.2d at 428.
101. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
102. Judge Davidson was appointed to the bench upon the death of Judge Levine.
t Mr. Anderson received a J.D. from the School of Law in May of 1979, and was a
staff member of the University of Baltimore Law Review throughout the
publication of volume eight. This casenote, a product of his work while a member
of the Law Review, was delayed in publication because of space limitations in
prior issues. - ED.

